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 ABSTRACT 
 
The mass shooting is always a sensitive topic in America and it hurts the society a lot. 
Some pieces of literature have already proved that mass shootings will have impacts 
on the stock market and investors’ economic behavior. We are going to narrow down 
the study area to the firearms industry instead of the total market. To explore the 
relationship between the stock return of firearms’ industry and mass shootings, we 
conducted a thorough analysis including descriptive and fundamental analysis, non-
parametric test and a GARCH (1, 1) model. We first identify two uptrends after the 
event day, which is resulted from investor confidence and fear-based buying 
individually. Then, we use a GARCH model to quantify effects from shooting events 
on the firearms industry and found 0.181% and 0.533% incremental for daily and 
weekly in the event window. We also decompose the event window into two different 
windows according to two uptrends and have 1.1% and 0.521% abnormal return for 
each. The results show that the first event window is related to the date of mass 
shootings more closely while the second is not. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Gun policy has been argued between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party 
during a long period. Each time after a mass shooting, the gun policy will be 
concentrated and argued about for a long time among the politicians and citizens in 
America. During the period when Barack Obama was the president, he initiated a pool 
for controlling guns. The result of this pool was out of 99% at that time, indicating 
most citizens have the intention to control the selling and use of guns. However, this 
intention has never been applied to real life. In this condition, mass shootings are still 
happening in a high frequency. 
Figure 1 shows that the United States has an incredible death rate from gun 
violence under comparing with other developed countries. The United States ranks the 
9th among the world on indicators of socioeconomic success, including education, the 
medical system and happiness of citizen. However, the U.S. ranks 31st high on the 
death rates of gun violence in the world while other developed countries have really 
low rates of gun violence like Canada and Japan (sources: IHME). In addition, the U.S. 
with other 6 countries can account for over 50% death in gun violence events among 
the world in 2016. America takes 14.8% of it as the only developed country among 
those 6 countries. The United States not only ranks high in homicide incidents but also 
suicide incidents. It represents 35.3% suicide incidents out of the total among the 
world. As for the U.S. itself, figure 2 shows that there are nearly 53,100 incidents 
involving gun violence in America and results in 13,592 death and 26,280 injuries. 
Especially we should pay attention to the gun violence targeted on children and teens, 
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which may generate more effect on society. There are 627 children and 2,467 
teenagers get killed or injured in 2018, which is such an astonishing number (sources: 
Gun violence Archive). Also, campus shootings and mass shootings are reported by 
social media much more frequently than the general type of shootings after the 
occurrence because children and teenagers are sensitive groups to get involved. In 
average, the United States nearly has one school shootings per week during 2018, 
which is a terrifying number for the citizens.  
All of these incidents have effects on the country. They are not limited to society 
and politics, but also include the capital market. There are some unique thoughts on 
gun controlling and using in the U.S. while other countries may not have. For example, 
possessing guns in China, Japan or Korea is illegal so that there will not be any 
firearm manufactory can sell guns to citizens. They may blame on the firearm industry 
after gunshot events happened because of the poor control of guns and this depression 
may bring down the stock return of these companies if they are publicly traded. 
However, citizens in the U.S. may assign their blame on the security condition instead. 
For example, after the mass shootings happen in Santa Fe High School on May and 
Jewish community in Pennsylvania in October last year, the solution is to strengthen 
security by arming teachers or working stuff guns individually. They may not blame 
on the firearm industry and they may turn to buy more guns from manufactories in the 
opposite, which may benefit the firearm industry and their stock return. So this is the 
initial motivation for us to write this paper to verify our assumption. 
What is the uniqueness of this paper? First of all, we are going to focus on the 
mass shootings happened in the U.S. only. This topic has not been explored well 
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before while it always has great attractions. Second, we are going to focus on a 
specific industry instead of the total market. Considering some industries may not be 
sensitive to shooting events, we are going to concentrate on the firearm industry, 
which is a directly related industry. Third, we may have some comparable groups of 
different types of companies in our samples. For example, we may have three different 
groups including the manufactories, gun selling companies and companies associated 
with NRA. We want to explore the abnormal return of these different groups to see 
where the blame goes. Finally, we extend the event window to different time periods 
to capture any shock and compare them. 
What do we find? First of all, we find out that firearm industry outperforms the 
total market in a trading month after the gunshot events happened and falls to a 
relatively lower level but still higher than the level before the event. However, we 
identify two uptrends during this period, which are resulted from two different reasons. 
Secondly, we explore the true driving force of these two uptrends. For the first trend, 
we believe it results from the good expectation from investors because of the short 
persistence. For the second trend, we conduct a fundamental analysis and find out an 
incremental on revenue, which lasts for nearly two quarters and we prefer to call it 
fear-based buying as the literature before. We believe the second uptrend is related to 
this outperformance on their sales because of the long persistence and time-matching 
with the releasing time of financial documents. Thirdly, we use a GARCH model to 
identify the average abnormal return in the event window, which is 0.181% for daily 
return and 0.533% for weekly return. After that, we find out that the abnormal return 
in the second uptrend is not closely related to mass shootings while the first one is 
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significantly affected by mass shootings. This result leads us to speculate that the first 
uptrend is associated with the date when mass shootings happened and the second one 
is related to the releasing of financial documents. 
This paper contains five parts. First of all, we will go through a literature review 
to find support for our study and make some adjustments to form our framework. 
Secondly, we will explain our data and its resources. Thirdly, we will briefly describe 
our methodology. We will illustrate our methods individually because we adopt 
different methods in different parts of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Considering there are few studies related to our topic, we start from two similar 
research fields, which are terrorism and political events. There are many papers 
studying the relationship between stock market and terrorism since 1965. Most of 
these studies focus on three fields, which are the total market, the investors’ behavior 
and analysts’ forecasts. For the total market, Karolyi and Martell (2010) examined the 
effect of the terrorist attack on the capital market since 1995 to 2002, covering 75 
terrorism events and identified a -0.83% stock price reaction after terrorism events 
happened. Besides, Hamilton (1983) found that it may take a longer time for a 
developed country to forget the terrorism. Karolyi and Martell also found that 
terrorism in developed countries are much easier to go through higher negative price 
reactions. As for the investors’ behavior, some studies argue that the fear of the 
terrorism will affect investors’ economic behaviors in a long time period (Becker and 
Rubinstein, 2004). In the area of analysts’ forecasts, Antoniou, Kumar, and Maligkris 
found that analysts who are local to the terrorism events are more pessimistic than 
average forecasts, which may bring negative fluctuation to the stock market. 
There are also massive researches about the effect of political events on the 
capital market, which uses the traditional way of studying daily stock return and event 
studies (Warner, Brown, 1983). For the general study, some papers study the various 
political events’ effect on the stock market, including elections, governmental policies 
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change and so on (Niederhoffer, Gibbs and Bullock, 1970, Peel and Pope, 1983). They 
actually did not find enough evidence to support their hypothesis about the effect of 
general political events on the stock market but still provide meaningful results. 
Recently, more and more papers discover the underlying relationships between 
political events and the stock market and find a way to scale the effects (Chan and Wei, 
1996, Bittlingmayer, 1998).  
Political events and terrorism have some similar characteristics with shooting 
events. They are non-economic events. They are made by humankind with unpredicted 
power and motivations. They are public information accessed to all investors. Based 
on these similarities, we can use some conclusions as support in our paper. We believe 
mass shootings will have effects on stock market and firearms industry because it 
generates fear to the market. What we want to explore is whether the effect is positive 
or negative and how large is it. 
However, political events and terrorism are slightly different from gun violence 
events. Political events are somehow anticipated. For example, citizens in America 
always have anticipation to the results of elections and they may have prepared for it. 
But gun violence events are totally unpredicted. Political events may not generate 
nation-wide fear or anger, such as elections or tax policy reform. In contrast, gun 
violence will generate fear or anger in nation-wide, especially the mass shootings and 
campus shootings. As for terrorism, shooting events have a narrower definition. 
Terrorism is related to politics or religion more often and usually initiated by 
foreigners. Gun violence can be included in the broad type of terrorism but it has its 
own characteristics. Shooting events happen regionally and have a higher frequency. 
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So we need to adjust the assumptions and definitions in the papers we mentioned 
before and make our own assumptions. 
There are limited studies concentrating on the effect of mass shootings. Cross and 
Pruitt found out that mass shootings perform significant effects on targeted companies 
by using Newton CT shooting and Aurora shooting as their random sample (Cross, 
Pruitt, 2013). However, they only include two single companies and two single mass 
shooting events in their study. Wallace explored the relationship between mass 
shootings and gun sales after mass shootings. Results suggest that mass shootings may 
bring out incremental on gun sales (Wallace, 2015). 
We construct a framework based on the traditional way of doing researches on 
daily return and event study. But we have made some adjustments in this framework. 
First of all, we redefine some concepts. We redefine the event days of gunshot events 
as 21 trading days after gunshot happened, which is the interval of [T0, T21]. We 
should not take days before gunshot events as event days because these events cannot 
be anticipated. Second, we define the event window as [T−21, T21] so that we can 
compare the effect of mass shootings before and after the event day. Also, we made 
some extension to the event window to see if they are going to fall back to the normal 
level. Thirdly, we adjust our study target to a specific industry instead of the total 
market. In this condition, the abnormal return may be more obvious to identify. The 
effect on the total market may be smoothed by some industries which are not sensitive 
to shooting events. 
Based on our framework and adjustments, we adopt a top-down approach to start 
from the result we have and explore the reason behind the results. First of all, we will 
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identify the effect of mass shootings on the stock market and firearms industry. 
Secondly, if there do exist some abnormal effects, we will explore the real reasons 
behind it and find the main driving forces. Thirdly, we will quantify the average level 
of abnormal return in our parametric model. Finally, we will compare three different 
groups of companies and make a conclusion of investors’ reaction to shooting events. 
We will run both of nonparametric test and parametric test in our paper to reach our 
conclusions. 
2.2 Hypothesis 
Based on all the related papers we read and the study we concentrate on, we propose 
some hypothesis. The shooting events we include in our sample are all known 
nationwide and cause more than 10 fatalities and we believe these events have 
attracted enough focus and have effects on the stock market and firearms industry. 
Based on the literature review and our assumptions and intuition about this topic, we 
made such four hypotheses. 
 H1: The return of the firearms industry will experience higher volatility in the 
event window. H2: The abnormal return of our portfolio will be positive  H3: There may exist some fear-based buying after mass shootings H4: Investor confidence and increasing gun sales may be the reason for any 
possible shock on stock return 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND FACTORS 
 
3.1 Gun violence events 
We collect 16 massive gunshot events since 1990 from CNN, Washington Post, Gun 
Violence Archive and Wikipedia. The criteria we select our samples are based on the 
fatalities and social effect. If we are going to study the effect of gun violence events on 
the stock market, we may concern the attention of investors. We first derive the 
sample of all shooting events happened in the United States since 1990 and filter them 
by the fatalities. Considering the huge volume, we are not able to filter them one by 
one so we use a two-step method to select our samples. First of all, we select all the 
gunshot events with more than 10 fatalities since 1990 and search all the events on 
CNN and Washington Post to see if there were reports about them. Secondly, we 
compare the mass shootings recorded in Wikipedia because it is widely used, which 
includes 24 events, and delete the events which are not recorded in Wiki. Figure 1 
shows a sample of 16 gunshot events.   
3.2 Stock return data 
There are over 5,000 data in my sample based on the 16 events we select. Considering 
our events sample is not big enough, we decide to use the daily stock return to increase 
the frequency of the data. First of all, we select the S&P 500 index as the reflection of 
the total stock market because we believe the S&P 500 consistent is more broad and 
representative. We get the daily return data of the S&P 500 from CRSP and take them 
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as the benchmark for the portfolio we will construct after. Then, we define the event 
window as the 21 trading days after the day when the gunshot event happened, which 
is 𝑇𝑇0 in the paper. For analyzing the trend of stock return, we extend the interval to [𝑇𝑇−21, 𝑇𝑇64], which is long enough to see the trend clearly. 
For the portfolios we construct, we first find the SIC code of our targeted 
companies and industries in the library of Kenneth R. French. The firearms industry 
code is between 3480 and 3489. We collect all the companies have ever been publicly 
traded from 1990 to 2018. Secondly, we search daily stock return data on WRDS 
according to the SIC code we specified before. Thirdly, we apply the event window 
concept we defined before in this section too. Finally, we process the data to get the 
data we want to use in our model we will describe after. We calculate the abnormal 
return, cumulative abnormal return and turnover in each event and aggregate all the 
events together to calculate an average value. All these factors are calculated on value-
weighted. 
3.3 Profitability Data 
To explore the reasons for the fluctuation, we decide to make some fundamental 
analysis of our constructed portfolio. There would be two possible reasons for the 
fluctuation, which are an increase in profitability and another one is investors have a 
good expectation for the portfolio. Profitability data are easier to get and more 
objective so we collect some important profitability data from WRDS, including sales, 
earnings, ROA and ROE. Due to the difficulty to acquire daily sales and earnings data, 
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we prefer quarterly data instead. Figure 2 shows all factors we used in our paper and 
illustrate how we calculate them. 
Considering that all events are recorded based on the calendar date, we decide to 
use calendar quarters on financial data instead of fiscal quarters. The standard calendar 
quarters are January, February, and March (Q1); April, May, and June (Q2); July, 
August, and September (Q3); and October, November, and December (Q4). We are 
interested in the comparison between the month before gunshot events and the month 
after gunshot events so that we can see if there is an increase in profitability after 
gunshot events. We have covered 114 calendar quarters since 1990 Q1 and we also 
dropped some abnormal data in our sample. For example, the return of equity (ROE) 
on 2008 Q1 approaches 1000%, which was caused by one abnormal data of a specific 
company so we delete that record to make it more comparable. Basically, we assign a 
different value to different quarters. 
Basically, we will run into some problems when we process the data, such as the 
problem of overlapping and quarters located in different years. First of all, we are 
trying to assure that we make each quarter in the same year. For those cannot be 
adjusted, we will allow at most 1 quarter locates in the other year. Secondly, we have 
3 events run into the problem of overlapping because they happened in the same 
quarter or happened in consecutive quarters. For these quarters, we will allow two 
consecutive 𝑄𝑇. For example, we have two gunshot events happened in 2012 are 
located in 2012 Q3 and 2012 Q4 individually. We assign number 2 to both Q3 and Q4 
and locate the 𝑄𝑇+1, which is the first quarter in 2013. 
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In this section, we still calculate the factors based on the value-weighted 
adjustment. We have the quarterly shares outstanding on the end date of each quarter. 
In addition, we have the highest and lowest price during that period, which we can use 
to calculate the average price. Then we calculate the enterprise value as below: 
        𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑊𝑊 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑊𝑊 = (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔+𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑)
2
× (𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡+𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡)
2
           (1) 
After we have the enterprise value of each company, we can calculate the weight 
and get different weights in each quarter so that we can have our value-weighted 
profitability data. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Summary 
We apply the classic event study methodology to our samples, which are brought up 
by FFJR (1969) and developed by Warner and Brown (1985). Now that we are not 
focusing on the abnormal return on each event individually, we do not run MVRM 
model in this paper. There are a lot of empirical results indicate that daily stock return 
is not normally distributed, which allows us to do some non-parametric test. So before 
we conduct our parametric model, we first go through a nonparametric test to verify 
that the gunshot events will bring more volatility to the firearms industry on event 
days than non-event days. Then we run trend analysis and fundamental analysis to 
analyze the endogenous driver for the fluctuation. Finally, we use a GARCH (1, 1) 
model to quantify the abnormal return and compare firearms with the total market and 
other portfolios we constructed. 
There are four parts in this section. Part one is the methodology of the 
nonparametric test, which is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Part two and three are about 
the fundamental analysis trying to find out the endogenous driver. Part four illustrate 
the GARCH model we adopt in this paper. 
4.2 Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test 
First of all, we should make sure that shooting events do have effects on the stock 
market and firearm industry. If we get a positive conclusion, we may keep on 
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exploring more details. The nonparametric model gives us a lot of options to test a 
sample not subjected to a normal distribution. Additionally, the sample we derived 
before is unmatched because gunshot events are unusual items and it can be divided 
into two unmatched samples. Finally, we decide to run a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to 
detect the distribution and compare the two samples. The reason we select this test is 
that it is appropriate for the purpose of comparing the unmatched samples, which are 
not subjected to a normal distribution. 
We use the stock return data from 2007 to 2018, since it contains most of the 
sixteen events. Then we define the event days as 20 trading days after the gunshot 
event happened. Traditionally, other paper will define event days as an interval of [𝑇𝑇−5, 𝑇𝑇5] because news can be leaked or anticipated. However, gunshot events are 
unpredictable and may generate volatility to the market in a longer period. 
Furthermore, we take daily volatility as the variable to be tested, which is actually the 
square of the daily return. The calculation is also employed by other papers before 
(Chan, Wei, 1996).  
                                                   𝑅𝑡 = ln 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡−1                                                        (2) 
                                            σ = E�𝑅𝑡2� − (𝐸(𝑅𝑡)2)                                           (3) 
There are some studies have already proved that the mean daily stock return in a 
long period should be zero. So if we assuming that the mean return is zero, we will 
have 𝐸(𝑅𝑡)2 as zero, which indicates that σ = E�𝑅𝑡2�. So we rewrite the formula as: 
                                                    σ = (ln 𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
)2                                                    (4) 
14 
 
Furthermore, we consider the volatility of our targeted industry, which is the 
firearms industry, after we test the volatility of the stock market. It can be calculated in 
two ways, which are close to close volatility and open to open volatility1. Because 
some gunshot events happened during the trading hours while some happened after the 
market is closed. So we test them separately across all the market and the results are 
analyzed in the next section. 
4.3 Descriptive Analysis 
We derive a relative huge sample ranging from 1990 to 2018, which contains nearly 
38,000 data. We would not use all of them because of the absence of some data. 
However, we still have more than thousands of data. So we decide to run a basic 
descriptive analysis based on all effective data. 
First of all, we calculate abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return as 
below. 
                                                   𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡                                               (5)       
                     𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,1) × ⋯× (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) × (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)             (6) 
We take 𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 as the daily stock return of company 𝑖 at the time 𝑡 and the same to 
other factors. The reason we take stock return instead of price as our factors is that 
prices are not as clean as returns under the effects of enterprise value, shares and 
dividends. We can see the real change of intrinsic value indicated by the stock return. 
Considering we are going to concentrate on the abnormal return caused by shooting 
events, we should subtract the return of the total stock market, which is 𝑟𝑖,𝑡. 
1 A method adopted in Chan, Y. C., & Wei, K. J. (1996). Political risk and stock price volatility: the case of Hong 
Kong. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 4(2-3), 259-275. 
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We take 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 as the cumulative stock return so that we can see the trend of 
this stock in the event window. Abnormal return can be both negative and positive and 
will change in a relatively larger scale than the cumulative abnormal return. So if we 
want to identify the effect of gunshot events on the intrinsic value of stocks, the 
cumulative one is preferred. We use the (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑛,1) as the initial value of the 
cumulative return of a stock and multiply it after by daily data. In order to see the 
performance of the firearms industry, we calculate abnormal return and cumulative 
abnormal return for both the stock market and firearms industry so that we can 
compare two results. 
Also, we use turnover as an indicator to identify the direct reaction from investors 
to the gunshot events, which represents the frequency of trading. We do the 
calculation as below. 
                                      𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡                                               (7) 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 and 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑊𝑊 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑛,𝑡  represent the traded volume and the shares 
outstanding of company 𝑖 at the time 𝑡 accordingly. The turnover is a good indicator of 
the reaction of the stock market and investors to the gunshot events. 
4.4 Fundamental Analysis 
Briefly speaking, the fluctuation of the stock return should be contributed by two 
drivers: profitability and expectation. The former one is more related to the company 
while the latter one is talking about the expectation of investors. 
In this part, we first analyze the profitability of our portfolio to see if there is any 
significant endogenous growth. We conduct a fundamental analysis based on the 
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quarterly financial data we described before. The analysis consists of three parts, 
including profitability analysis, Dupont analysis and liquidity analysis. The 
profitability analysis is going to extract the main reason for the fluctuation of stock 
return. We include ROA, ROE and growth rate of revenue in this part to roughly see 
the trend. The Dupont analysis part is a more detailed analysis of profitability. We 
want to use 3-step Dupont analysis and 5-step analysis to see the most important 
driver for the change of ROE and ROA. Finally, we will conduct a liquidity analysis, 
which includes the current ratio and account receivable ratio. For a mature company 
and industry, account receivable will be straightforward data to see if the revenue has 
been experienced a strong trend of increasing. So we adapt current ratio and account 
receivable ratio as our indicators.  
In a word, the fundamental analysis is a part following the section of descriptive 
analysis and nonparametric test. We would like to figure out the real reason for the 
potential fluctuation and prepare for the parametric study. 
4.5 Parametric model 
Descriptive analysis and fundamental analysis ignore some statistics problem of our 
sample, such as auto-related. So we need to use a parametric model to test our 
assumptions.  
Theoretically, the abnormal return of firm 𝑛 will be the differences between its 
return without dividends and the return of the market. However, there will exist some 
error terms or other noises in this market model. So we rewrite it as: 
                                               𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 − ?̂?𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼�                                            (8) 
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In this formula, 𝛼� is a constant and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 is the real error term, which should be 
written as: 
                                          𝑅𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼� + 𝜀𝑖,𝑛,𝑡                                            (9) 
Both of the market model and OLS model are assuming that they have identical 
expectations and variances, which leads us to the problem of conditional 
heteroscedasticity and bias the estimation. The dependent problem becomes much 
more severe when it satisfies three conditions: heterogeneity of abnormal return, 
heterogeneity of residual variance and homogeneity of event windows. To solve these 
problems, more and more scholars begin to use Multivariate Regression Model 
(MVRM) and ARCH model (Chan, Wei, 1996; Chen, Bin, Chen, 2005). Traditional 
studies have already proved that it would be appropriate to use autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity because the return data may have volatility clustering. 
Based on these studies, we construct a model, including a dummy variable 𝐷𝑡. It 
equals to one if that day is in the event window [𝑇𝑇−21,𝑇𝑇21] while it would be zero if 
that day is not located in the event window. We take the return of our portfolio as the 
sum of three parts, which are the market return, abnormal return and an error term. 
The market return has clustering volatility and should take lag terms into consideration 
so that we modeled the market return of [𝑅𝑀𝑡−𝑛,𝑅𝑀𝑡+𝑛] in equations. For the part of 
the abnormal return, we add a dummy variable in our model to solve the conditional 
variance and take the parameter 𝜃𝑖𝑡 as the abnormal return. We take the aggregated 
data to run the ARCH model and the 𝜃�𝑖,𝑡 we get in this process is actually the average 
abnormal return across different events. Considering we do not care about if different 
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events have different effects on the firearms industry, we will not estimate them 
separately. 
The basic ARCH model has two equations, which are mean equations and 
variance equation. In the mean equation, the mean of our sample will be explained by 
some independent variables and a constant. 
                                              𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡                                                      (10) 
And the variance equation is like: 
                                      𝑊𝑊𝑡2 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑊𝑡−12 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (11) 
In this model, we can test the hypothesis that there is no ARCH effect in our error 
term, which means there is no volatility clustering effect in our data. 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛾1 ≠ 0 
After going through these two basic equations, we could move on to simply 
model our sample. The model can be written as:              𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑀𝑡−𝑛 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑀𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑀𝑡+𝑛 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀      (12) 
However, for most financial data, it would be usual to have such volatility in a 
long time period, which means we may have infinite lag terms in the ARCH (n) model. 
This is too complicated to do the analysis. So we move on to the GRACH model, 
which is more simple and neat by reducing parameters which should be estimated. 
To have a more clear view, we should notice the error term 𝜀~𝑁(0,ℎ𝑖𝑡2). First of 
all, we will give the equation of the ARCH (n) model. 
                  ℎ𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜑𝑖0 + 𝛾𝑖1𝜀𝑖(𝑡−1)2 + 𝛾𝑖2𝜀𝑖(𝑡−2)2 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝜀𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)2               (13) 
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In the GARCH model, we could simply add a lag term of the variance ℎ𝑖𝑡
2 to the 
equation (13) and we can note the lag term as ℎ𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)2. In this way, we could rewrite 
the equation (13) as: 
 ℎ𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜑𝑖0 + 𝛾𝑖1𝜀𝑖(𝑡−1)2 + 𝛾𝑖2𝜀𝑖(𝑡−2)2 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝜀𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)2 + 𝛽𝑖1ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1)2 + ⋯+                                                                  𝛽𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)ℎ𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)2                                                  (14) 
Many studies will prefer the GARCH (1, 1) model with higher efficiency. 
                      ℎ𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜑𝑖0 + 𝛾𝑖1𝜀𝑖(𝑡−1)2 + 𝛽𝑖1ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1)2                                         (15) 
This is the GARCH (1, 1) model framework instead of the ARCH (n) model. 
ARCH model is the basic model in the section of time series studies. However, the 
GARCH model is neat and less complicated. It will not lose too many parameters 
needed to be estimated. 
After applying the basic model before, we decide to decompose the average 
abnormal return to two different groups, which are the abnormal return in the first 
event window and second event window individually. Here is the decomposed model:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑀𝑡−𝑛 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑀𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑀𝑡+𝑛 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
In this model, we are going to use two dummy variables instead of a single 
dummy variable. For the dummy variable 𝜔𝑖𝑡, we assign the value one to the days in 
the first event window and zero otherwise and we apply the same method to the 
second dummy variable 𝜏𝑖𝑡. The error term has the same distribution as before. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Wilcoxon test results 
In this section, we run this test three times based on different measures. We test the 
volatility of the S&P 500 and firearms industry both. The null hypothesis is that the 
volatility of event days and non-event days are identical and the alternative hypothesis 
is that they are different from each other. Table 4 shows the result of the Wilcoxon test 
we run on the S&P 500, which have a P-value as 0.0289 on the significant level of 5%. 
This result is not strong enough to support our conclusion that gunshot events will 
bring volatility to the stock market. Our interpretation is that S&P 500 is a portfolio 
covers many industries and companies so its reaction to gunshot events may be 
smoothed. Also, gunshot events are different from terror attacks because gunshot 
events may not generate terrifying environment and will not increase the cost of safety 
for all kinds of enterprises.  
Table 5 states the test we run on the firearms industry. We include two different 
calculations in this test, which are close-to-close volatility and open-to-open volatility. 
The former one has a p-value of 0.0001 and the latter one has a p-value of 0.0012, 
which are both significant at the level of 5%. It strongly supports our assumption that 
the gunshot events will bring more volatility to the stock market and the firearms 
industry.  
From all panels, we can conclude that gunshot events will increase the volatility 
of stock return both to the total market and portfolio. Especially for the firearms 
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industry, the p-value is smaller than 0.01, which is very significant. So we should 
make some detailed analysis to see if there is an uptrend or downtrend on stock return 
after the gunshot event happened. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics results of firearms industry 
As we described before, we construct a portfolio consists of all the publicly traded 
firearms companies and do some simple analysis of the return data. 
First of all, we calculate the enterprise value based on the share outstanding and 
price data of each company. Secondly, we calculate the daily value-weighted 
abnormal return of this portfolio on each day. Finally, we draw out the trend of these 
return data. 
The enterprise values we calculate is based on the average price of highest ask 
price and lowest bid price. In this way, we can avoid to have a negative price and be 
more reasonable to have an average price over a trading day instead of using the close 
price. We can identify that there will be two or three companies take account for most 
of the market weight over than 70%, which means this industry is relatively mature 
and concentrated so we had better use the value-weighted method to adjust the bias. 
After we have the weight of each company in our portfolio, we calculate the 
value-weighted stock return and compare it with the stock market return. In this 
section, we are using trading days instead of the calendar day. So we actually have 21 
trading days in a month. So we would like to compare the cumulative return in the 
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time period of [𝑇𝑇−21,𝑇𝑇21], which is both a lag of the event month before and after the 
gunshot events happened.  
We can identify an obvious uptrend after the event day 𝑇𝑇0 and this trend has not 
been weakened in 20 days after the event day. Even though the return of index has a 
small incremental, it should not be the main reason for the strong uptrend of the 
portfolio’s return. This result is expected since the firearms industry is directly related 
to shooting events. In the S&P 500, other industries will smooth out the return 
fluctuation in a shorter period than the firearms industry. In order to compare the 
differences between the total stock market and portfolio we constructed, we put the 
two trends together, which is more straightforward. 
Now that we identify an obvious return uptrend of our portfolio relative to the 
total stock market, we should focus on the abnormal return of our portfolio to see if 
there is any sharp incremental of the value-weighted abnormal return. Terrorism 
events may bring fear to all investors, which may lead to an uptrend on the premium 
of risk. In this way, we will have a higher cost of capital, which is the discount rate, 
and lower enterprise values. So the price and stock return of total market will 
experience huge volatility. However, gunshot events are not like terrorism. They may 
not bring the same volatility to the total market. So it would be more straightforward 
for us to study the firearms industry and explore their abnormal return. 
Figure 2 gives us a clear view of the trend of abnormal return, which is a strong 
uptrend after 𝑇𝑇22, which is the date when gunshot events happened. We take 22 
trading days as a month and we have 66 days in total, which means we are exploring 
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the abnormal return of a month before gunshot events and 2 months after gunshot 
events. We identify two uptrends in the event window. One is starting from 𝑇𝑇22 to 𝑇𝑇54 
while another starts from 𝑇𝑇55 to 𝑇𝑇66. This consecutive uptrend is somehow unexpected 
because we believed the effect of gunshot events would not keep for such a long time. 
However, the second trend of incremental has a smaller slope than the first one and 
may benefit from the compounded return. So we decide to extend our data to include 
one more month in our graph and found out the cumulative return falls back to the 
normal level at the end of the third month after gunshot events. We are curious about 
such a long persistence because it is not matched up with our assumption that the 
gunshot events will have a short-term effect on the firearms industry. So we decided to 
analyze the turnover data to see if there are any possible reasons for this. 
We plot the equal-weighted turnover and value-weighted turnover in the same 
graph to see the consistency and get a better view. From the graph, we locate two 
significant fluctuations during this time period. The turnover increases sharply at the 
day when gunshot events happened from 13 to the level of over 25 in just a week. 
Then it came into the first period with a relatively stable turnover while the abnormal 
return is keeping goes up. During this period, the cumulative abnormal stock return 
rises sharply from 0.98 to 1.05. On the day of 𝑇𝑇45, there is another significant 
fluctuation, which is extremely similar to 20 days before. Oppositely, we identify a 
downtrend of cumulative abnormal return after this significant fluctuation of turnovers. 
To see the results more clearly, we combined the data of return and turnover in a 
single graph. There is another uptrend of cumulative abnormal return after the 𝑇𝑇54 and 
have not shown a downtrend.  
24 
 
There are a few reasons to explain it. First, our portfolio experiences a month of 
positive abnormal return to arrive at such a high cumulative return. Basically, it will 
have an effect like compounded interest. The base number of cumulative abnormal 
return of that day is 1.03, which means even if a modest positive abnormal return can 
bring up our cumulative abnormal return. Second, we believe that there is asymmetric 
information on the stock return. Investors are confident about the performance of the 
firearms industry after the shooting events so they take a long position in the market 
after shooting events. After they earn most of the excess return, they believe the stock 
may fall back to the normal level before shooting events in the future, so they take a 
short position. However, other investors may have asymmetric information and 
believe they have captured a great investment opportunity because of the decreasing 
price. So there is a second-time clustered trading and simulate the cumulative 
abnormal return to experience another incremental. 
As the supplemental of CAR, we calculate the periodic return based on the 
calculation of CAR. CAR will always be greater than 1 so we think the periodic return 
may be a great indicator too. We just subtract one from each CAR and get the periodic 
return. From figure5 and 6, we also identify two uptrends which are consistent with 
what we found on CAR trend and it is more straightforward. Comparing with the 
second uptrend, the first one has a shorter time period and smaller incremental. We 
explain the first uptrend as the good expectation or confidence of investors in the 
firearms industry. Because it happens immediately after the event day with a sharp 
increasing and end in a short time period, which is 15 days long. However, the second 
one persists nearly 50 days, which is nearly 3 trading months. We are curious about 
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the second uptrend. If the market is efficient, the first uptrend of return should already 
include all expectations in it and it will not have another uptrend during the period 
when investors verify their expectations. We also analyze the weekly data and identify 
the same uptrends. However, weekly data is more helpful in plotting the abnormal 
return due to its lower frequency. We use the two standard error bands method to 
curve the abnormal return and find out it will approach zero at the end of the time 
period. The distance of upper bands and lower bands also guide us to predict the trend 
in the future. From figure 8, we can see the distance is getting larger in the end, which 
means the trend may become reversal in the next period, which is decreasing. 
In the next section, we are going to focus on using fundamental analysis to 
analyze the profitability and see if there is really an endogenous driver for the second 
uptrend. 
5.3 Fundamental analysis 
After part of the nonparametric analysis and descriptive analysis, we believe that the 
stock return of the firearms industry will experience an uptrend in the following two 
months after gunshot events. In this section, we want to explore if there is an uptrend 
in their profitability. We assign 2 to the quarter when shooting events happened. Then 
we assign 1 to a quarter before, 3 to a quarter after and 4 to the 2nd quarter after the 
event quarter. For the event happened near the end of quarters, we assign the month 
after the border as our event quarter. For example, if the shooting event happened in 
September, which is the end of Q3, we will take Q4 as our event quarter. This is the 
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solution to the lagged reaction on financial data to the shooting events and makes sure 
the event quarters can reflect the real change. 
First of all, we try to explore the changing of quarterly total revenue. We plot the 
revenue of four quarters, which are the event quarter and quarters around it in figure 5. 
We can identify there do exist an incremental on revenue in the event quarter, which is 
about 270 million. However, after the event quarter, the revenue drops immediately 
and falls back to the normal level as Q1, which is the quarter before the event quarter. 
We offer several explanations for it. First of all, people often fell depressed and fear 
after mass shooting events and they are aware of that gun control policy will not be 
tightened in a short time. To assure their safety, they will purchase more guns to 
protect themselves. Second, there are many shooting events happened in public 
properties, including shopping malls, churches and offices. After the shooting events, 
the security of these properties may be strengthened by their owners. For example, 
after the shooting event happened in the Jewish Community, they chose to buy more 
guns and employee more securities to make sure that the tragedy will not happen again. 
However, there are many different kinds of revenue incremental. It may be 
endogenous, exogenous, temporary and permanent. So we need to concentrate on the 
change of their ROA and ROE2. 
From figure 6, we find some interesting results. The ROE and ROA basically 
keep the same trend, which indicates our portfolio has a relatively stable financial 
leverage level. However, there is a sharp uptrend in the event quarter and a downtrend 
after Q2 and get to the lowest level in Q3. Then it will bounce back to the level as Q1 
2 Return of assets and return of equity. We take the average level of assets and equity to make this calculation. 
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and Q2 in Q4. It seems like the mass shootings boost the ROA and ROE of the 
firearms industry temporarily, which may lead investors to inefficient pricing. So we 
decide to have a sight into the real profitability so we are going to go through a 
fundamental analysis. 
For the 3-step Dupont analysis, it is useful to analyze both ROA and ROE. 
Considering we already have stable financial leverage, we plot net income margin and 
asset turnover in a single graph to compare the trend. From figure 7, we can see that 
the net income margin experiences a significant downtrend after gunshot events 
happened, decreasing from 7% to 3%, which is a significant loss for a mature industry. 
Even though we have a downtrend of assets turnover between Q2 and Q3, we can 
attribute it to the incremental of revenue in Q2 and the downtrend happened in Q3. We 
need to figure out the reason for the fluctuation of the net profit margin. 
So we break down profit margin to EBIT margin, which is operating margin, and 
the burden of interest and tax. The EBIT margins on three quarters are 13.86%, 
13.65%, 14.16% and 13.45% individually, which is very stable. This is consistent with 
the characteristics of such a mature industry.  
From figure 8 we can identify that there is a significant downtrend of the tax 
burden and fluctuation of interest burden while the EBIT margin is relatively stable. 
Tax burden can be seen as 1 minus tax rate in a simple way. A high tax burden 
indicates the company has abilities to keep most of its pretax income. A downtrend of 
tax burden means a more heavy tax from the government and the company is losing 
more pretax income. After exploring our sample and data type, we consider this 
downtrend as a reasonable trend because of the characteristic of tax from both the state 
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government and the federal government. Most of the government will begin to tax 
companies in December and January. We have more than 3 events happened at a very 
late date of a year. For example, the gunshot event happened in the elementary school 
in Connecticut occurred on the date of December 14th, 2012. In this case, we may 
assign the next quarter as quarter 3, which will include the tax season in it. So the tax 
burden will have a sharp downtrend in quarter 3. The bouncing back of tax burden in 
Q4 also verify our thoughts. 
After we explore the tax burden, we turn to study the interest burden.  The 
interest burden indicates the portion of EBIT will be left to the company itself so that a 
higher interest burden leads to a higher ROE. Figure 8 shows a fluctuation of interest 
burden, which cannot be explained because there are many companies in our portfolio 
and they may have very different capital structure. 
After running through a detailed Dupont analysis, we believe the profitability of 
the firearms industry has not changed during this period. The normal ROE should be 
around 5% and ROA should be around 2%, which is consistent with a mature industry. 
Combined with our analysis on their revenue, we can arrive at a conclusion that the 
firearms industry will experience a short term incremental on revenue without 
significant change on the operating ability. This incremental will end in the following 
two quarters. We have run some test on the seasonality on the sales of the firearms 
industry and find no strong support for it. Even if we do have seasonality in our 
samples, the Q1 to Q4 we assigned are different from calendar quarters so it may 
smooth out the effects of seasonality. 
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Recall the results we have in the section of descriptive analysis, the cumulative 
abnormal return will experience a sharp uptrend in the following month and show a 
short time downtrend after. Then there will show up another strong uptrend in the 2nd 
month after the event month. So we decide to extend our time period to a longer time 
to match up with our quarterly data to explore the duration of this uptrend of stock 
return. We calculate the cumulative abnormal return for the 𝑇𝑇−21 and take that day as 
the start point and 𝑇𝑇88 as the ending date, which is 3 months after the gunshot events 
happened. We can see that the first uptrend persists for nearly a month while the 
second uptrend exists nearly 3 months, starting from 𝑇𝑇50 to 𝑇𝑇100, which is exactly 4 
months after the event day. This time period covers a quarter in it so it offers some 
opportunities for investors to acquire information on the sales of the firearms industry. 
As we can see, the revenue of Q2 and Q3 are both higher than Q1 and Q4. So no 
matter where will the event day or event month located, investors will have a chance 
to get financial information in the open market. So we identify this uptrend resulting 
from the incremental of short-term revenue. As for the first uptrend, we believe they 
have no access to their daily sales data but they will have access to stock price and 
return data, so we attribute it to the good expectation of investors. 
In a word, the incremental on revenue and ROA or ROE may be a guide for 
investors to make their decisions, which may lead to more and more investors to 
increase their holdings in the firearms industry. This can explain the second uptrend. 
After mass shootings boost up the revenue and other financial ratios, investors begin 
to increase their investments and bring up the stock return. However, most of them are 
not aware of that this incremental is temporary and expect this revenue is driven up by 
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some endogenous factors. This mispricing may be used by institutional investors to 
arbitrage. 
5.4 Parametric test results 
In the nonparametric test part, we conclude that the first uptrend is the benefit of good 
expectation of investors and the second one results from the short time incremental on 
sales and ROA or ROE. We want to conduct some parametric test to quantify the 
effect of shooting events on the stock return. 
First of all, we should decide whether we are using a 20 years period or just a 10 
years period. We found most studies will try to include more events in their sample 
data to get more ideal results. In our sample, we only have 16 shooting events because 
we are focusing on the mass shootings reported by social media across the country and 
most of them happened in years between 2007 and 2018, which is the 10 years period. 
To have a better estimation, we are going to use the 10-year time period. 
Secondly, we need to test if our sample data is a stationary time series. If the 
results are negative, we should make some adjustment to make it stationary and run 
our model then. We adopt the DF-GLS test to have a more robust result. From table 6 
we can see that the test statistic is always bigger than the critical value of each 
significant level, which indicated we should reject the null hypothesis that our data 
sample has unit roots. So we do not have to adjust our data to fit in a time series study.  
Thirdly, we should test if there is any volatility clustering existing in our data 
because we only need to adopt ARCH or GRACH when we run into the problem of 
volatility clustering. In this condition, we will have autoregressive conditional 
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heteroscedasticity. We line out a simple two-way graph between the portfolio return 
and our time variable and the volatility clustering is obvious. There are four huge 
volatility pikes during this 10-year time period and other small pikes, which indicates 
there do exist volatility clustering in our sample data. 
Then, we will conduct a more detailed analysis to explore the ARCH effect in our 
model. We may think of a very simple autoregressive model without the dummy 
variable or other independent variables. We just need to consider the lagged terms 
with our dependent variable. For example, we can consider the model like this: 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝑅𝑀L + ε 
Where the RML is the lagged term of market return and j represents portfolios. 
We can take this AR (P) as a one-vector VAR to identify how many lags we 
should include. We adopt the information rule to run the test and find that most test 
indicates we should use a seven lagged model, which is AR (5) model. In addition, 
two results indicate that we should use AR (2) model. Therefore we first use OLS to 
simply estimate the model and decide the number of lag terms. We find the model 
includes 2 lag terms is more consistent because the third and fourth lag terms are both 
not significant. However, if we take AR (2), the model would be too simple and we 
may lose some efficiency. So we decide to use AR (5) model, which is also significant.  
Then we test the error term of this OLS result and we conclude that the error term 
has ARCH effect. All lags are significantly rejecting the null hypothesis that there are 
no ARCH effects in the error term. Based on all these results, we think it would be 
better for us to run an ARCH model. After we apply the information rule to the 
variance, we found that the volatility will last for a long period, which means there 
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would be more and more lag terms to be included in our equation, which is too 
complicated to calculate. So we adopt GARCH (1, 1), which is actually an infinite 
ARCH model with a more neat result. 
First of all, we run the GARCH (1, 1) model by assuming the error term is 
distributed as normal distribution and include the dummy variables 𝐷𝑡, which will be 
assigned as 1 if it is in the event window otherwise zero. The results indicate a strong 
GRACH effect in our model with both coefficients of ARCH and GARCH are 
significant with a sum nearly to 1, which is consistent with the mean reversion theory. 
Besides, the dummy variable is significant on the level of 1% with a positive 
coefficient of 0.00225, which means that our portfolio may have a 0.225% abnormal 
return on average in the event window. 
As we said before, stock return data may not be distributed like the normal 
distribution and have sharp peaks or fat tails instead. So we test the normality of the 
error term by using the Jarque-Bera test, which is very efficient. The results reject the 
null hypothesis that the error term distributed normally at 1% significance level. So we 
draw out the distribution graph of our sample and find out a higher peak and fat tails 
than the normal distribution. We decided to add a distribution option in our ARCH 
model. Basically, we are assuming they have a t-distribution instead. The results are 
shown below. After the adjustment of our model, the dummy variable is still 
significant on 1% level and the abnormal return is 0.181% for trading days in the 
event window. 
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Finally, we also predict the forecasted variance. The results show that the 
volatility will persist in a long time period in the future and we believe the stock return 
of the firearms industry will still be sensitive to the gunshot events. 
Since the lagged terms in our model are both not significant, we go back to our 
information rules test and find if we extend the lag terms to 8, the results suggest us to 
use AR (5) model so we are going to run the same model in the condition of 5-lagged 
terms in our model. We put two results in the same table to compare. It is interesting 
to identify that the fifth lagged term is significant on 5% significance level, which 
indicates that the stock return of market on the trading day 𝑇𝑇−5 will have a negative 
impact on the trading day 𝑇𝑇0 because we have a negative coefficient as -0.053. Five 
trading days mean exactly a week before and after in calendar. We are curious about 
this coefficient so we decide to explore more on weekly data.  
We covert our daily data to weekly data and the observation becomes 1,489. 
There are 52 trading weeks on average in a year. We first test the effect of the first 
week together with the event window. However, the results indicate there is nothing 
special on the first week and we have a 0.533% abnormal return for weeks in the event 
window. Then, we decompose the effect into two different components. We take the 
first four weeks in the event window as our observations for the first uptrend 
according to the figure of periodic return we showed before, which is [𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇21]. The 
figure indicates the second uptrend starts from 𝑇𝑇50 and ends on 𝑇𝑇100, so we allocate the 
7th – 16th week after the event week to the observations of the second uptrend. We run 
the GARCH model again without the dummy variable event we used before because 
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we are going to decompose it. The results show 1.098% and 0.521% incremental on 
the weekly return of our portfolio and they are significant on 5% and 10% level 
separately. We can conclude that mass shootings’ effect on the first uptrend is more 
significant than the second uptrend. This is consistent with our assumption that the 
first uptrend is highly correlated with mass shootings while the second one is not. 
There are two reasons. First, the second uptrend is far from the day when mass 
shootings happened. So the effect from mass shootings may be weaker as time passes 
by. Also, we believe the first uptrend already incorporate investors’ expectations on 
increasing revenue. However, our portfolio still experiences another huge increasing a 
month later. We attribute this to earnings surprise. The possible reason for this uptrend 
may be that investors find out the real incremental on sales is much higher than they 
thought. So this uptrend may be more closely related to the earnings announcement, 
which we can discuss in another solely paper. 
After running the GARCH model on the firearms industry, we also briefly run the 
same model on our comparable portfolios. There are two sub-portfolios which may 
relate to shooting events. One of the comparable groups is the portfolio of gun-selling 
companies and another is companies associated with the NRA. The results suggest that 
the shooting events may not bring an abnormal return to the portfolio. Both of the tests 
are not significant at the 10% level. So we cannot conclude that shooting events will 
have effects on the related portfolios. However, we do have some interesting results to 
share. After the shooting events happened on February.14th in Parkland Douglas High 
School, which is a tragedy attracts a lot of attention, most of the companies in gun-
selling portfolio announced they will strengthen their control of gun sales and stop 
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selling guns directly in the store. In the meantime, a lot of companies associated with 
the NRA has announced to terminate the cooperation with them. We want to see if 
these announcements benefit them. Considering this is not our focus in our study, we 
just analyze their aggregated abnormal return in the event window of the shooting 
events in Parkland. We define event days as the date they made announcements. We 
found the abnormal return shows a clustering positive volatility in a week after event 
days. This related to another topic that showing social responsibility of CEOs may 
have positive effects on stock return. 
As President Trump has not taken any actions on strengthen gun control, we 
believe investors actually have confidence in the party in power right now. Figure 14 
and 15 show us the trend of power changing. Republicans are performing stronger 
since the 1990s while Democrats are getting weaker these years. There is a study 
indicates there are 62 mass shootings since 1982 and 25 of them happened after 2006 
when the Republicans are performing well on taking power. So we believe the party in 
power may play an important role on the confidence of investors on the firearm 
industry, which is a topic we may discuss in another paper. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Our interests in this topic originate from the consecutive announcements leased by a 
lot of companies after the shooting events in Parkland. Most of them chose to 
terminate the cooperation with the NRA and stand on the opposite to them, which may 
be a strategy to keep their customers. I followed up their stock price, which shows a 
strong uptrend after the announcement. So we are wondering about the condition of 
the most directly associated industry after shooting events, which is the firearms 
industry. 
In this paper, we start from the question of what is the trend of the firearms 
industry’s stock return after shooting events. Basically, we found that stock return will 
experience two uptrends in different time periods. Then we concern about the reason 
for these uptrends. After a thorough analysis, we believe the first uptrend results from 
investors’ confidence and good expectations. For the second uptrend, the incremental 
on revenue and ROA or ROE may offer us a great explanation. The incremental leads 
investors to buy in the stock. Finally, we use econometrics model to quantify this 
abnormal return and we derive the results as 0.181% and 0.533% for daily and weekly. 
Then we decompose the abnormal return on weekly data into two components, which 
are the first uptrend and the second uptrend. We conclude that these two uptrends have 
an abnormal return as 1.098% and 0.521% individually. Also, the abnormal return of 
the first uptrend is related to mass shootings more closed while the second uptrend is 
not very significant related. 
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We think this paper is slightly different from the papers before concentrating on 
political events and terrorism. A study of mass shooting events may be a good 
supplement to this field of research. First of all, we narrow down our study objects to 
the firearms industry and shooting events, which is a more specific study. Secondly, 
we use gun-selling companies and companies associated with the NRA as comparable 
groups and run the GRACH model again. The results suggest shooting events have no 
significant effect on them. At the very beginning, we thought citizens will assign their 
blame on firearms industry or gun selling companies because of the poor control of 
guns. However, the result shows the opposite thought and help us revise our 
assumptions. Firearms industry will not get hurt in the shooting events. On the 
opposite, they will benefit from the shooting events. Finally, we try to decompose the 
abnormal return in the event window to different groups which sounds like a process 
of stripping out two different event windows. The reason for this analysis is that we 
find out two uptrends before in the descriptive analysis and we want to quantify them 
and find their relations to mass shootings. The results suggest that the first uptrend is 
closely related to mass shootings while the second one is not. 
We notify there are some drawbacks in our paper. For our sample, we could add 
more shooting events in. As social media develops at a faster pace, there are more and 
more shooting events will be reported publicly and more citizens will get access to 
these information quickly. So we can extend our sample larger. For the parametric test 
part, we could estimate different events individually or we can divide the events into 
different groups to see if they have different effects. For example, we can have a 
subgroup including campus shootings only and compare it with other events. Finally, 
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we should consider the time difference. Some studies suggest that gun shock has 
already become a “new normal” to the stock market. So the abnormal return on mass 
shootings in recent 5 or 10 years would be different to before and we can explore on 
that by setting two models for two different time horizons. 
There are still a lot of topics can be extended from this paper. We are curious 
about the stockholders of each company in the firearms industry. We believe their 
party may have some effects on the stock return of the firearms industry. Considering 
the existence of the NRA, we think it would be necessary to include political topics in 
our study. Also, we can discuss more about why the negative emotions of citizens do 
not reflect on the stock market as terrorism does. It would be a great point to start from 
our conclusion that the stock return of the firearms industry will benefit from the 
shooting events. In addition, we can pay attention to the two clustering peaks of 
turnovers. The investors come in can possess a lot of excess return while the investors 
come after the second peak may not have such a high return. Who are those investors? 
Are most of them institutional investors or individual investors? Finally, we can keep 
narrowing down the study objects to campus shootings and shooting events related to 
racial and religion. Both of these two types of shooting events usually will attract more 
attention from society and citizens may be more sensitive to these events. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES FOR DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
Table A. 1 Shooting events sample 
 Event day State City Place Fatalities Injured 
1 1991/10/16 Texas Killeen restaurant 24 27 
2 1999/04/20 Colorado Littleton High School 13 21 
3 1999/07/29 Georgia Atlanta trading firms 12 13 
4 2007/04/16 Virginia Blacksburg University 32 17 
5 2009/11/05 Texas Fort Hood military base 13 42 
6 2009/04/03 New York Binghamton civic centre 13 4 
7 2012/07/20 Colorado Aurora Cinema 12 70 
8 2012/12/14 Connecticut Newtown Elementary School 28 2 
9 2013/09/16 Washington Southeast  Navy Yard  12 3 
10 2015/10/01 Roseburg Oregon UCC Campus 10 8 
11 2015/12/02 California Bernardino Service center 16 17 
12 2016/06/13 Florida Orlando nightclub 49 53 
13 2017/11/06 Texas San Antonio Baptist church 25 20 
14 2017/10/02  Nevada Las Vegas Mandalay Bay  58 851 
15 2018/02/14 Florida Parkland High School 17 15 
16 2018/05/18 Texas Santa Fe High School 10 13 
Notes: This sample is not large enough to compare with other studies. However, we think 
shooting events is not like terrorism. Terrorism may attract more attention from citizens and it 
is nationwide while shooting events may not. Events like Santa Fe High School and Las Vegas 
shooting may attract a lot of attention. So we introduce fatalities and reported frequency as a 
selection criterion. 
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Table A. 2  Data description 
 Description 
Data Analysis Illustration 
ROA 
Profitability 
Analysis 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑊𝑊 𝐴𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑊𝑊 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑠⁄  
ROE 
Profitability 
Analysis 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑊𝑊 𝐴𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑊𝑊 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
Revenue 
Sales 
Analysis 
We take the quarterly total revenue of our 
constructed portfolio as our input. 
Net profit margin Dupont Analysis 𝑁𝐼 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑊𝑊  𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑢𝑊𝑊⁄  
Asset Turnover Dupont Analysis 𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟 =   𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑣 𝐴𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑊𝑊 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑠⁄  
Financial 
Leverage 
Dupont Analysis 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑣𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑊𝑊 =  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
EBIT margin Dupont Analysis 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑣⁄  
Interest Burden Dupont Analysis 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑛 =  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇⁄  
Tax Burden Dupont Analysis 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑛 =  𝑁𝐼 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑇⁄  
Account 
Receivable ratio 
Liquidity 
Analysis 
𝐴/𝑅 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝐴
𝑅
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑠�  
Current Ratio 
Liquidity 
Analysis 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟.𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑠⁄  
Notes: All financial data we use write in this table are quarterly data. We use them to calculate 
financial ratios and prepare for the fundamental analysis. 
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Table A. 3 Quarters selection 
 Description 
Value Numbers Illustration 
0 83 
There are 83 quarters are not located in 
the event window, which covers the 
[𝑄𝑇−1, 𝑄𝑇+1]. 
1 11 
There are actually 12 quarters located 
before 𝑄𝑇, which is corresponding to the 
numbers of 𝑄𝑇+1. However, we find few 
abnormal values in that month so we 
decide to delete this record. 
2 12 
There are 12 quarters have gunshot 
events happened in it. As we said before, 
we would allow consecutive 𝑄𝑇 in our 
sample. 
3 11 
There are 11 quarters we take as 𝑄𝑇+1. 
This group of data is cleaner than 𝑄𝑇−1. 
Notes: This table shows the assigned value we have made for each quarter. Basically, we 
assign the value one to the quarter before events happened. We assign two as the value of 
quarters when shooting events happened and take the quarter after as value three. Besides, we 
assign value zero to all other quarters which are not located in the event window. 
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Table A. 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Market Return 7181 .0003926 .011 -.09 .116 
Portfolio Return 
(value-weighted) 
7181 .0003849 .016 -.104 .191 
Portfolio Return 
(equal-weighted) 
7181 .0008305 .009 -.0783 .107 
Value-weighted Turnover 7181 14.192 30.31 .299 705.74 
Notes: This table is the descriptive statistics for our stock return data. We constructed our 
portfolio in both the value-weighted and equal-weighted way. Results suggest that we should 
use the value-weighted portfolio return data. In such a long time period, the stock return 
should obey the mean reversion rule, which means that the stock return will fall back to the 
mean level in a long time period.  
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES FOR WILCOXON TEST AND GARCH MODEL 
 
Table B. 1  Test for the S&P 500 from 2015 to 2018 
a. Summary Statistics 
 Numbers Volatility 
  Mean Standard deviation 
Event day 77 0.00008 0.00017 
Non-Event day 803 0.00007 0.00015 
All day 880 0.00007 0.00016 
b. Wilcoxon rank-sum Test for 𝜎𝜎2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎2𝑁𝑁 
 Numbers of 
Event days 
Numbers of 
non-event days 
Z-Statistics P-value 
Values 77 803 -2.184 0.0289 
Notes: This table is the results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the total market. We first 
calculated the standard deviation of the sample of event days and found out that the return of 
event days have higher volatility. Then we apply the Wilcoxon test and get a p-value of 
0.0289, which is significant at 5% level. Not all industries are sensitive to the shooting events 
so that the effect may be smoothed out in a way. 
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Table B. 2  Test for the firearms industry from 2015 to 2018 
a. Summary Statistics 
 Numbers Close-to Close Volatility  Open-to-Open Volatility 
  Mean Standard deviation  Mean Standard deviation 
Event day 77 0.00125 0.00301  0.00133 0.00311 
Non-Event day 803 0.00067 0.00172  0.00069 0.00143 
All day 880 0.00072 0.00187  0.00744 0.00165 
b. Wilcoxon rank-sum Test for 𝜎𝜎2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎2𝑁𝑁 
 Numbers of 
Event days 
Numbers of 
non-event days 
Z-Statistics P-value 
Close-to-Close  77 803 -3.793 0.0001 
Open-to-Open  77 803 -3.229 0.0012 
Notes: This table is the results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the firearms industry. 
Comparing the standard deviation difference between event days and non-event days for the 
total market, the difference of the firearms industry is larger. Also, the p-value is much smaller 
and significant at 1% level. This result gives us strong supports that shooting events will have 
strong effects on the firearms industry. 
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Table B. 3  Results of DF-GLS Test for stock market 
DF-GLS Test for the return of S&P 500 
Lags 
DF-GLS 
Test Statistic 
1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value 
1 -42.665            -3.480 -2.845         -2.557 
2 -32,445            -3.480             -2.844             -2.556 
3 -28.325            -3.480             -2.844             -2.556 
4 -26.360            -3.480             -2.843             -2.555 
⋮     
27 -9.992            -3.480             -2.832             -2.545 
Notes: We need to run a DF-GLS test to make sure our sample will not run into the problem of 
a unit root. Although there are many studies already verifies this conclusion, we still need to 
test our sample. We also run the same test for the firearms industry and get similar results to 
the total stock market. This indicates we do not have to make any adjustments to our sample 
data. 
 
 
 
 
Table B. 4  LM test for ARCH effects 
lags(p)   chi2 df Prob>Chi2 
1      116.203 1 0.0000 
2      572.332 2 0.0000 
3      588.864 3 0.0000 
4      648.819 4 0.0000 
5      774.030 5 0.0000 
                    H0: no ARCH effects      vs.  H1: ARCH (p) disturbance 
Notes: We adopt the LM test to explore the ARCH effect in our sample. Some studies before 
already proved that the LM test is a relatively efficient method to find the ARCH effect. 
(John.J.Binder, 1985). We find all the p-values on different lag terms are significant at the 
level of 1%, which suggested we should reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis. 
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Table B. 5  GARCH model results under different distributions for the firearms 
industry 
 Normal Distribution t-Distribution 
VARIABLES r ARCH r ARCH lndfm2 
      
L.mkr -0.0214  -0.0316   
 (0.0254)  (0.0248)   
L2.mkr -0.0258  -0.0298   
 (0.0248)  (0.0240)   
event 0.00225***  0.00181***   
 (0.000708)  (0.000630)   
L.arch  0.0549***  0.0615***  
  (0.00522)  (0.00967)  
L.garch  0.937***  0.928***  
  (0.00539)  (0.0107)  
Constant 0.000332 2.62e-06*** 0.000484* 3.62e-06*** 1.309*** 
 (0.000297) (5.97e-07) (0.000276) (1.18e-06) (0.165) 
      
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,892 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  This GRACH (1, 1) model is running based on the lag terms of two. The variable 
named as event is the variable represents whether the trading day is in the event window. The 
p-values under different distributions are both significant, indicating that shooting events have 
a significant positive return on the firearms industry. The value of lndfm2 indicates we should 
use the t-distribution instead of the normal distribution. 
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Table B. 6  2 lag terms and 5 lag terms model results under t-distribution 
 2-lagged model 5-lagged model t-distribution 
VARIABLES r ARCH r ARCH lndfm2 
      
L.mkr -0.0316  -0.0323   
 (0.0248)  (0.0249)   
L2.mkr -0.0298  -0.0302   
 (0.0240)  (0.0242)   
L3.mkr   -0.00664   
   (0.0244)   
L4.mkr   -0.000406   
   (0.0241)   
L5.mkr   -0.0563**   
   (0.0241)   
event 0.00181***  0.00184***   
 (0.000630)  (0.000632)   
L.arch  0.0615***  0.0610***  
  (0.00967)  (0.00961)  
L.garch  0.928***  0.928***  
  (0.0107)  (0.0106)  
Constant 0.000484* 3.62e-06*** 0.000520* 3.58e-06*** 1.309*** 
 (0.000276) (1.18e-06) (0.000277) (1.17e-06) (0.164) 
      
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,889 2,889 2,889 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  This GRACH (1, 1) model is running based on the lag terms of five. It is very 
interesting to have the fifth lag term significant at the level of 5%. Five trading days is actually 
a calendar week, which indicates the investors may have a lag reaction to shooting events. We 
speculate that investors may be curious about the attitude of the government. If the 
government, especially the president, have present a positive attitude toward the policy of gun 
control, investors may choose to dump most shares they possessed of the firearms industry. 
The dummy variable is still significant in this case, showing a significant and positive effect 
from shooting events on stock return. 
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Table B. 7 GARCH (1, 1) model results of gun-selling companies  
 2-lagged model 5-lagged model 
VARIABLES r ARCH r ARCH 
     
eventdays 2.98e-05  3.25e-05  
 (8.92e-05)  (8.89e-05)  
L.spr -0.0717***  -0.0726***  
 (0.0230)  (0.0232)  
L2.spr -0.0628***  -0.0630***  
 (0.0205)  (0.0206)  
L3.spr   0.00150  
   (0.0219)  
L4.spr   -0.0123  
   (0.0216)  
L5.spr   -0.0689***  
   (0.0231)  
L.arch  0.0420***  0.0420*** 
  (0.00359)  (0.00362) 
L.garch  0.948***  0.949*** 
  (0.00362)  (0.00368) 
Constant 0.000609*** 1.86e-06*** 0.000649*** 1.82e-06*** 
 (0.000225) (2.52e-07) (0.000227) (2.55e-07) 
     
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,889 2,889 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  After we found out shooting events will bring a positive abnormal return to the 
firearms industry, we are curious about where would the investors assign their blame on. This 
is the result of GARCH (1, 1) on the portfolio of gun-selling companies. However, we have 
not found any significant incremental of positive abnormal return after shooting events. They 
are significantly affected by the lag terms, which is consistent with the characteristic of stock 
return. 
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Table B. 8 GARCH (1, 1) model result of companies associated with NRA 
 2-lagged model 5-lagged model 
VARIABLES r ARCH r ARCH 
     
L.mkr -0.00133  -0.00352  
 (0.0305)  (0.0305)  
L2.mkr 0.00228  0.00178  
 (0.0291)  (0.0294)  
L3.mkr   -0.0165  
   (0.0282)  
L4.mkr   -0.00367  
   (0.0288)  
L5.mkr   -0.0504*  
   (0.0302)  
event -1.43e-05  -1.28e-05  
 (8.28e-05)  (8.33e-05)  
L.arch  0.112***  0.111*** 
  (0.00993)  (0.00987) 
L.garch  0.865***  0.867*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0101) 
Constant 0.000559** 7.41e-06*** 0.000610** 7.30e-06*** 
 (0.000260) (7.79e-07) (0.000262) (7.80e-07) 
     
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,889 2,889 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  As we did not find any incremental on the return of gun-selling companies, we turn to 
the portfolio consists of companies associated or cooperated with NRA. NRA plays an import 
role in America politics. We construct a very rough portfolio included companies from 
different industries so we do not expect to have significant results on lag terms. However, the 
dummy variable is also not significant, which leads to the conclusion that shooting events 
have no significant effects on companies associated with the NRA. 
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Table B. 9 GARCH Model for weekly data of firearm industry 
 Without the effect of the first week With the effect of the first week 
VARIABLES week_return ARCH week_return ARCH 
     
L.week_mkr 0.0305  0.0299  
 (0.0408)  (0.0408)  
L2.week_mkr 0.0382  0.0376  
 (0.0420)  (0.0422)  
event 0.00533**  0.00460*  
 (0.00256)  (0.00269)  
L.arch  0.0386***  0.0383*** 
  (0.0104)  (0.0104) 
L.garch  0.950***  0.950*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0137) 
if_firstweek   0.0124  
   (0.00794)  
Constant 0.00243** 1.84e-05* 0.00243*** 1.82e-05* 
 (0.000943) (9.90e-06) (0.000942) (9.89e-06) 
     
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  In this model, we use the weekly data to extend our event window and see if the 
effects of shooting events are still significant. Also, we found out that the market return on the 
fifth lag term is relatively significant, which represents a trading week. So we added another 
dummy variable with one if the timing is in the first week and zero otherwise. The results 
indicate the trading weeks in the event window will have 0.53% cumulative abnormal return 
weekly. However, whether the week is the first week is not significant or we can see it is only 
significant at a level on 10%. If we expand our sample size, we may have a better result. 
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Table B. 10 Decomposed Effects For Two Uptrends Based on Weekly Data 
 Decomposition for two uptrends 
VARIABLES week_return ARCH lndfm2 
    
L.week_mkr 0.0244   
 (0.0404)   
first_uptrend 0.0110**   
 (0.00444)   
second_uptrend 0.00521*   
 (0.00310)   
L.arch  0.0383***  
  (0.0104)  
L.garch  0.950***  
  (0.0137)  
Constant 0.00235** 1.84e-05* 1.409*** 
 (0.000928) (1.00e-05) (0.240) 
    
Observations 1,481 1,481 1,481 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  We generate two different dummy variables to test the sensitivity of two different 
uptrends to mass shootings. The first dummy variable is first_uptrend, we assign value one to 
it if it is a week in the first trading month and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is 
second_uptrend, we did the same value assigning as before. Also, we did not include the 
dummy variable event we used before in this model because these two dummy variables have 
already covered all event window and they can help us decompose the effect in event window. 
From results above, we are able to conclude that mass shootings have more significant effect 
on the first uptrend than the second uptrend. 
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APPENDIX C 
FIGURES USED IN OUR PAPER 
 
Figure 1 Firearms industry outperform the stock market after shooting events 
 
Notes:  The blue line represents the cumulative return of S&P 500 in the event window while 
the red one represents the cumulative return of firearms industry in the event window. We 
identify a significant uptrend starting from the trading day 𝑇𝑇22, which is the event day we 
defined before. The cumulative return begins to increase after event day and it will last a 
week. Then the slope becomes steeper after a week and brings the cumulative return to a 
higher level. An interesting phenomenon is that the cumulative return has a second uptrend 10 
days after event day. 
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Figure 2 Cumulative abnormal return of firearms industry 
 
Notes:  After we identify there are two uptrends after event days, we want to have a more 
straightforward view of the abnormal return. The graph shows a significant uptrend between [𝑇𝑇22,𝑇𝑇45], which is 23 trading days. In other words, the incremental of abnormal return will 
last for nearly a month after the event day. The slope has been decreasing after a month. 
However, the CAR has not fallen back to the normal level before. We have some explanations 
offered in the text before. 
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Figure 3 Turnover analysis of firearms industry 
 
 
Figure 4 Cumulative abnormal return combined with turnovers 
 
Notes:  We put these two figures together to illustrate our conclusions. The turnovers are 
always fluctuating around the level of 15. There are two significant peaks in the event 
window, which are consistent with two uptrends of cumulative abnormal return. Also, the 
peaks of turnovers will show up before the uptrend of CAR. This result will help us 
understand the confidence of investors better. 
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Figure 5  The periodic return of firearms industry based daily data 
 
Notes:  We calculate the periodic return by deducting one from each cumulative abnormal 
return and have the same trend. We can see that the periodic return in the first uptrend 
approaches 4% but only persist for nearly 10 days. However, the periodic return in the second 
uptrend performs great and has been increasing for over 2 months. This uptrend is obviously 
more related to the incremental on revenue we find out before. 
 
Figure 6 Two standard error bands of periodic return 
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Figure 7  Trend analysis of weekly abnormal return data 
 
Notes:  In this figure, we used weekly data so that we can extend our event window to a period 
consistent with quarterly data. In our sample, a trading month includes 4 trading weeks so we 
decide to use 16 weeks as our event window, which is 4 months in calendar. We take 
[𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊1,𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊4] as our first month and the 5th as the event week. The event week is also the 
beginning of our event window and we extend it to the end of 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊20, which constitutes 4 
months after the event week. We can identify that the abnormal return is relatively stable after 
the 13th week and show a steady trend of maintaining at a level near zero. Comparing with the 
cumulative abnormal return, the abnormal return has not added substantial incremental on the 
cumulative return in the 4th month after the shootings. The high level of the cumulative return 
is based on a huge incremental before and it has compounded advantage. 
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Figure 8  Quarterly revenues before and after mass shootings 
 
Notes:  Quarter 2 is the event quarter while others are one or two lags of the event quarter. We 
explored the revenue data sorting by quarters. We assigned two to the event quarter and one to 
the quarter before the event quarter. Also, we give value three and four to the following 
quarters. Because a quarter includes 16 weeks and it may smooth out the effect so we try to 
make the month when shooting events happened as the beginning of a quarter. For example, if 
the shootings happened in March, which belongs to quarter one, we will assign the next 
quarter as our event quarter. In this way, we found an incremental on revenue in the event 
quarter. The revenue will have an obvious decreasing trend after the event quarter and fall 
back to the level as the quarter before event quarter. This is consistent with our assumptions. 
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Figure 9  The trend of ROA and ROE in different quarters 
 
Figure 10 Five-step Dupont analysis of ROE 
 
Notes:  In this figure, quarter 2 represents the event quarter while others are one or two lag 
terms of quarters. After we run a five step Dupont analysis, we find out that tax is the main 
reason for the decreasing of NI margin. We cannot give the exact explanation to it because 
different companies may have different effective tax rate. We can only conclude that the 
operating ability and profitability of firearms industry has no substantial increasing. 
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Figure 11 CAR of firearms industry in 4 months after shooting events 
 
Notes:  Even though the cumulative abnormal return will increase at a slower pace after, we 
still want to see if the CAR will fall back. So we extend the event window to 3 months after 
event day. We can see the slope is getting flatter since a month after the event day. Finally, we 
identify a sharp downtrend in the end of the 3rd month and drop back to a relatively normal 
level and the downtrend seems will last for a longer time. 
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Figure 12 Clustering volatility of firearms industry 
 
Figure 13 Forecasted volatility in the future 
 
Notes:  The first graph is the picture of the historical volatility of firearms industry’s stock 
return and the second one is the forecasted volatility in the future we derived from GARCH 
model. The clustering volatility will always be a characteristic of firearms industry’s return. 
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Figure 14 Percentage of Republican on the control of power since 1978 
 
Figure 15 Percentage of Democrat on the control of power since 1978 
 
Notes:  These two pictures draw a straightforward trend of the changing of power in America. 
Democrat behaves weaker since 1980s. The Republican took the power since 1990s and 
dominate the politics in America in most time. Generally speaking, Democrat will advocate 
the gun control policy while Republican will not. 
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